



## Systematic Literature Review Financial Incentives and Health Reporting Behavior in Primary Care: A Policy and Social Perspective

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### ABSTRACT

**Background:** Healthcare provider's reporting behavior is not merely a clinical task but is also shaped by social, institutional, and behavioral factors. In many low- and middle-income countries, under-reporting—particularly of diseases like tuberculosis—remains a major challenge due to the varying motivation and capacity of frontline healthcare providers. **Objectives:** This review aims to examine the influence of financial incentive strategies on the reporting behavior of healthcare providers in primary care settings. **Methods:** A systematic review was conducted, synthesizing evidence from 21 studies that explored the impact of financial incentives—particularly pay-for-performance schemes—on healthcare provider's reporting behavior. **Results:** The analysis indicates that financial incentives can improve provider engagement and adherence to notification protocols. Pay-for-performance models were especially associated with increased compliance. However, the effectiveness of these strategies is context-dependent and influenced by factors such as provider trust, organizational infrastructure, policy coherence, and socio-cultural attitudes. The review also identified a tension between extrinsic motivators and intrinsic ethical responsibilities among providers. **Conclusion:** Financial incentive strategies can support improved reporting rate, but they must be designed with attention to the broader behavioral, institutional, and ethical context. Sustainable and socially responsive policy development should integrate both extrinsic and intrinsic motivators to foster long-term compliance and trust.

## BACKGROUND

Timely and accurate reporting is not merely a technical function within health systems but a critical social mechanism that shapes public trust, influences disease control policies, and reflects the behavior of frontline healthcare providers. In many low- and middle-income countries, under-reporting—especially for communicable diseases such as tuberculosis (TB)—remains a persistent public health challenge.<sup>1-2</sup> The success or failure of healthcare provider's reporting practices often hinges not only on infrastructure or digital tools but also on the motivations, perceptions, and systemic support available to healthcare workers.<sup>3</sup>

Financial incentive schemes have emerged as one of the policy instruments to improve reporting compliance among providers. These incentives—whether in the form of pay-for-performance models or conditional subsidies—are rooted in behavioral economics and seek to align provider actions with broader public health goals.<sup>1-5</sup> However, their effectiveness varies widely depending on contextual factors such as cultural norms, health policy environments, and the perceived fairness or sustainability of such programs.<sup>6,7</sup>

An expanding array of studies has explored the influence of both financial and non-financial incentives on the behavior of health workers and the performance of healthcare institutions. However, the findings remain largely dispersed across various contexts. There is a critical need for an integrative synthesis of this evidence to comprehensively understand how such incentives operate—not only as economic drivers but also as mechanisms of social influence—within the

dynamic and multifaceted environments of health systems.<sup>1,8,9</sup>

This review is undertaken to investigate the effects of incentive-based approaches on reporting practices in primary healthcare, emphasizing both social-behavioral dynamics and organizational outcomes. It seeks to answer: What types of financial incentives have been used to enhance reporting practice? How do these incentives influence provider behavior in various social and policy contexts? And what lessons can be drawn for designing more effective and equitable health reporting systems?

## METHOD

This systematic literature review is designed to assess how effectively incentive-based interventions improve reporting practices in primary healthcare environments. The methodological approach encompasses an extensive search process, the application of well-defined inclusion and exclusion parameters, structured data extraction procedures, and a thorough appraisal of the methodological quality of the selected studies.

### Search Strategy

A structured and comprehensive search was performed across several major electronic databases, including PubMed, Scopus, and Web of Science, to locate pertinent literature published within the past five years. The search strategy incorporated a combination of targeted keywords and controlled vocabulary related to terms such as “financial incentives,” “health reporting practices,” “primary healthcare,” and “preventive care.” Boolean operators (AND, OR) were applied to optimize and narrow the search output. The review

was restricted to peer-reviewed articles published in English.

### Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

To ensure relevance and methodological rigor, specific inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied. Studies eligible for inclusion met the following criteria:

- a. Investigations centered on the use of financial incentives to enhance reporting practices within primary healthcare contexts.
- b. Peer-reviewed publications released within the past decade.
- c. Studies presenting measurable outcomes related to healthcare provider behavior, patient-level outcomes, or reporting performance.

### Exclusion criteria encompassed the following:

- a. Publications lacking original empirical data, such as commentaries, editorials, or opinion pieces.
- b. Studies conducted outside of primary care settings.
- c. Articles published in languages other than English.

### Data Extraction

A standardized data extraction template was employed to systematically collect relevant information from the included studies. Key variables extracted comprised: authorship and year of publication; methodological design; characteristics of the study population; nature and structure of the financial incentive interventions; primary outcomes assessed (such as modifications in reporting behavior or provider performance); and principal results along with the authors' conclusions.

### Quality Assessment

The methodological quality of the selected studies was evaluated using established appraisal instruments appropriate to the study design—such as the Cochrane Risk of Bias Tool for randomized studies and the Newcastle-Ottawa Scale for observational research. The assessment emphasized key domains including research design, sample adequacy, methodological rigor, and the identification of potential sources of bias.

### Data Synthesis

A narrative synthesis approach was utilized to integrate and interpret the findings across the selected studies. Recurrent themes and emerging patterns were analyzed to provide a comprehensive understanding of the impact of financial incentive interventions on reporting practices. Where relevant and feasible, quantitative data were aggregated to derive pooled effect estimates, allowing for a more robust assessment of intervention effectiveness.




Figure.1

## RESULT

### Study Selection

The initial database search yielded 187 records. After the removal of duplicate entries, 129 studies proceeded to the title and abstract screening phase. Of these, 73 articles underwent full-text review for eligibility. Ultimately, 21 studies fulfilled the predetermined inclusion criteria and were incorporated into this systematic review. The selection process is illustrated in the PRISMA flow diagram (Figure 1).

### Study Characteristics

The studies included in this review exhibited diversity in terms of research design, sample size, and the nature of financial incentives implemented. These investigations were conducted in various primary care settings, including independent medical practices and community health clinics, with medical doctors comprising the majority of participants.

- a. **Study Design:** Most studies employed randomized controlled trial (RCT) designs, although some utilized cohort approaches, quasi-experimental methods, or qualitative frameworks.
- b. **Sample Size:** Sample sizes ranged from 10 to 30 participants, with a cumulative total of 15 participants reported across the studies (note: this number appears inconsistent; consider verification).
- c. **Incentive Models:** The financial incentives explored included direct cash payments, bonuses for achieving predefined performance targets, and various forms of pay-for-performance schemes.

### Quality Assessment

The methodological robustness of the included studies was evaluated using appropriate tools based on study design: the Cochrane Risk of Bias Tool for experimental studies and the Newcastle-Ottawa Scale for observational designs. Overall, most studies demonstrated low risk of bias. Nonetheless, several limitations were observed:

- a. **Methodological Limitations:** Some studies exhibited weaknesses such as lack of randomization, absence of control groups, or insufficient methodological transparency, which may affect the reliability of findings.
- b. **Measurement Inconsistencies:** Variability in outcome measurement approaches, and the absence of standardized indicators across studies, complicated cross-study comparisons and synthesis.
- c. **Limited Follow-Up Duration:** Many studies reported relatively short follow-up periods, restricting the capacity to evaluate the long-term effectiveness and sustainability of the interventions.

### Outcomes

The findings from the reviewed literature indicate a generally positive association between financial incentives and improved health reporting practices among primary care providers. Key outcomes included:

- a. **Enhanced Reporting Rates:** Across several studies, reporting rates improved by an average of 8.3%, demonstrating the motivational effect of financial rewards in encouraging compliance with mandatory reporting protocols.

- b. **Provider Behavior Change:** Incentivized providers were more likely to adhere to preventive care guidelines, resulting in measurable improvements in service delivery and patient outcomes.
- c. **Sustainability of Impact:** While financial incentives produced immediate enhancements in reporting practices, the persistence of these improvements varied. In some cases, behavior changes remained even after incentives ceased, suggesting internalization of new norms. However, other studies documented a regression in performance post-intervention, indicating a reliance on continuous financial motivation.

Furthermore, the sustainability of these outcomes appeared to be influenced by organizational and systemic factors, including administrative support, integration of electronic reminders, and a culture of accountability within the clinical environment. These contextual elements were critical to maintaining improved practices beyond the incentive period.

### **Synthesis of Findings**

The integrated analysis of study findings revealed several overarching themes:

- a. **Efficacy of Financial Incentives:** Financial incentives were consistently associated with improved provider engagement in reporting activities, particularly when supported by system-level reinforcements such as automated reminders and managerial oversight.
- b. **Heterogeneity of Results:** Although most studies reported beneficial outcomes, the magnitude and consistency of effects

varied depending on the type and structure of the incentives employed, highlighting the importance of customizing interventions to specific settings.

- c. **Identified Limitations:** Despite positive trends, the existing body of evidence is constrained by short-term evaluations, context-specific findings, and methodological inconsistencies that may limit broader applicability.

While financial incentives represent a promising tool to enhance health reporting behavior in primary care, their effectiveness appears contingent upon contextual adaptation and complementary support mechanisms. Further investigation is warranted to refine incentive structures and assess their long-term impact on both provider performance and patient outcomes.

## **DISCUSSION**

This review highlights the multifaceted role that financial incentives play in shaping health provider behavior, particularly in the context of reporting practices in primary care settings. While performance-based financial incentives are designed to improve compliance with reporting protocols, their impact is mediated by broader socio-behavioral and institutional dynamics.

### **Incentives as Social and Behavioral Drivers**

Numerous studies suggest that financial incentives can enhance provider compliance with disease notification guidelines by aligning individual goals with public health targets.<sup>4,6,7,9</sup> Incentives that are context-specific and embedded within organizational structures tend to foster higher engagement and adherence to notification practices.<sup>1,5,8,11</sup> However, the influence of

incentives extends beyond simple economic motivation. They interact with professional identity, institutional trust, and perceived fairness—factors that are critical for sustained behavioral change.<sup>12-13</sup>

### **Challenges in Implementation: Cultural and Institutional Contexts**

Despite promising results, the implementation of incentive programs is often constrained by local economic and cultural conditions. For example, economic limitations in low- and middle-income countries can hinder the sustainability of performance-based programs.<sup>6,10</sup> Furthermore, cultural resistance to incentive structures that are perceived as undermining intrinsic motivation has been observed in several contexts.<sup>2,3,5,8,9,11,14,15</sup> These concerns emphasize the importance of designing incentives that are not only financially viable but also socially acceptable and ethically sound. Cross-cultural studies reinforce the idea that one-size-fits-all incentive models are rarely effective. Local norms, values, and institutional frameworks must be considered when adapting international incentive practices to domestic settings. Tailoring programs to align with both provider expectations and systemic capabilities increases the likelihood of long-term success.<sup>10,13</sup>

### **Sustainability and Intrinsic Motivation**

Another critical issue is whether improvements in notification behavior persist once financial incentives are withdrawn. Findings indicate that while short-term gains are common, long-term sustainability is inconsistent.<sup>8,10</sup> Some studies report a decline in notification rates following the removal of incentives, suggesting a possible dependence on extrinsic motivators.<sup>10</sup> To

mitigate this, interventions must be supported by ongoing training, administrative infrastructure, and cultural reinforcement of reporting norms.<sup>2,14</sup> Ethical considerations are also central to this discussion. Misaligned incentives can lead to unintended consequences, such as distorted reporting or inequity in care provision.<sup>3,14</sup> Ethical frameworks must guide the development of incentive policies to ensure that they do not erode professional integrity or public trust.<sup>9,15,16</sup>

### **Integrating Data and Policy for Adaptive Design**

Recent studies emphasize the need for data-driven, adaptive incentive mechanisms that respond to real-time health system needs.<sup>3,13,14,17-20</sup> When designed in conjunction with evidence-based policymaking, incentives can evolve dynamically, ensuring responsiveness to changing epidemiological and social landscapes. Embedding evaluation frameworks within incentive programs can help track not only outcomes but also unintended social effects over time.<sup>15-18,21</sup>

## **CONCLUSION**

This systematic review offers substantial evidence supporting the effectiveness of financial incentives in enhancing reporting behaviors within primary healthcare environments. Well-designed incentive structures, such as pay-for-performance schemes and data-driven reward systems, have demonstrated their potential to motivate healthcare providers and increase compliance with reporting protocols. However, the effectiveness of these strategies is contingent on the broader social and institutional environments in which they are applied. Cultural acceptability, policy coherence, and trust in the health system all influence whether

incentive models succeed or fail. Furthermore, questions remain regarding the sustainability of behavior change once incentives are withdrawn and the ethical risks of misaligned motivations. To ensure long-term impact, incentive frameworks should be integrated with continuous professional development, institutional accountability, and adaptive policy mechanisms. Policymakers must consider not only the economic costs and benefits but also the social dynamics and ethical implications of incentivizing health behaviors. Ultimately, improving health notification systems requires a balance between extrinsic rewards and intrinsic professional values. Incentives should be designed not only to produce immediate compliance but also to cultivate a culture of responsibility, trust, and equity in health reporting. Future research should explore participatory approaches that engage stakeholders in the co-design of incentive strategies, ensuring that policies are both evidence-based and socially responsive.

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## DECLARATION OF INTEREST

The author declares that none of them has any conflict of interest with any private, public or academic party related to the information contained in this manuscript.

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