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Grassroots Against the Bet: Community-Led Digital Resistance to Online Gambling in Indonesia

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Abstract

Online gambling (judi online, "judol") has become a major digital-era social and economic harm in Indonesia, particularly among young and low-income groups. This study examines community-led digital resistance as a demand-side complement to state-led site blocking and financial interdiction. It investigates how key opinion leaders, content aggregators, and youth, hobby, and government-linked communities construct and circulate anti-judol messages; how network structure shapes message reach and resonance; and whether exposure influences awareness, perceived norms, refusal self-efficacy, collective efficacy, and intention to abstain. A convergent mixed-methods design combines social network analysis, quantitative content analysis, digital-campaign analytics, a community survey, and interviews with campaign actors and institutional partners. The study integrates connective-action theory, the two-step flow of communication, collective-efficacy theory, and inoculation theory. It is expected to show that trusted brokers connecting otherwise separate communities can strengthen message diffusion, while empathetic and prebunking-oriented content can improve resistance to gambling promotion. The study contributes a Global South perspective on networked civic action and offers practical guidance for community-anchored interventions that complement enforcement, strengthen digital literacy, protect vulnerable groups, and build social resilience against online gambling.

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INTRODUCTION

Online gambling, locally known as judi online or "judol," has escalated from a marginal vice into a systemic socio-economic problem in Indonesia. Financial-intelligence data illustrate the scale of the phenomenon. According to the Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (PPATK), the circulation of online-gambling funds reached IDR 286.84 trillion during 2025, recorded across approximately 422.1 million transactions. Although this monetary value fell by about 20 percent from the IDR 359.81 trillion recorded in 2024 the first decline since 2017, PPATK reports that transactions have instead become more frequent, more dispersed, and smaller in amount, showing that participation has not contracted in proportion to the fall in monetary throughput (PPATK, 2026).

Two features of this data are decisive for the present study. First, online gambling in Indonesia is overwhelmingly a problem of the economically vulnerable: PPATK reports that about 71.6 percent of players earn less than IDR 5 million per month and also carry debt outside the formal banking system, and that deposits by minors aged 10–16 exceeded IDR 2.2 billion in the first quarter of 2025 alone (PPATK, 2025). Second, the harm is socially compounding, documented downstream effects include household debt, predatory online lending (pinjaman online), domestic conflict, and psychological distress (PPATK, 2025). Online gambling is therefore not merely a financial-crime statistic but a grassroots public-health and social-welfare emergency that reaches deep into low-income households and youth populations.

The Indonesian state has responded forcefully, primarily through top-down, technical-regulatory instruments: large-scale blocking of gambling sites and content, the freezing of affiliated bank accounts, the dissemination of suspicious-transaction analyses to law-enforcement agencies, and regulatory measures such as platform-governance rules to protect minors in digital space. These measures have produced measurable reductions in transaction value. Yet the persistence of more than twelve million active depositors and hundreds of millions of transactions reveals a structural limitation: supply-side suppression can raise the cost of access, but it does not by itself transform the demand-side beliefs, norms, and social practices that sustain participation. Blocking a site does not dissolve the desire to gamble, the normalisation of gambling within peer networks, or the influence of the promotional content that drew users in. The problem, in short, is that a phenomenon propagated through social influence and networked persuasion is being addressed almost exclusively through infrastructural control.

Existing scholarship addresses online gambling mainly through regulation, addiction, individual psychology, and increasingly through gambling marketing and social-media exposure. Primary studies show that gambling-related digital content can shape young people's attention, attitudes, and engagement, while large-scale financial data demonstrate that gambling involvement is associated with financial, social, and health harms (Abarbanel et al., 2017; Kaakinen et al., 2020; Muggleton et al., 2021; Thomas et al., 2018). However, three gaps remain. Empirically, little is known about whether the same networked communication environment can be used by communities to resist online-gambling harm, particularly in Indonesia. Theoretically, studies of gambling harm, digital activism, opinion leadership, collective efficacy, and inoculation are rarely integrated into a single explanation of community-led digital resistance to online gambling. Methodologically, few studies connect the structure of digital networks with message characteristics and audience-level behavioural outcomes in one mixed-methods design. This study addresses these empirical, theoretical, and methodological gaps by examining how community actors, KOLs, and content aggregators can repurpose networked communication from an instrument of promotion into an instrument of protection.

The general objective of this study is to analyse how community-led digital resistance to online gambling is constructed, circulated, and received in Indonesia. The specific objectives are:

1. To map and characterise how grassroots actors (KOLs, content aggregators, and youth, hobby, and government-linked communities) construct and disseminate anti-judol messaging across digital platforms.
2. To analyse how the structure of the KOL–aggregator–community network shapes the reach, brokerage, and resonance of community-led digital resistance to online gambling.
3. To assess the extent to which exposure to community-led digital resistance is associated with awareness, perceived social norms, refusal self-efficacy, collective efficacy, and the intention to abstain from online gambling among young, low-income Indonesians.
4. To derive practical and policy guidance for designing community-anchored interventions that complement, rather than duplicate, state enforcement.

Research questions are

1. RQ1. How do community-led actors construct and circulate anti–online-gambling messaging across Indonesian digital platforms?

2. RQ2. How does the structure of the KOL–aggregator–community network shape the reach and resonance of community-led digital resistance to online gambling?
3. RQ3. To what extent does exposure to community-led digital resistance shift awareness, perceived social norms, refusal self-efficacy, collective efficacy, and intention to abstain from online gambling among young, low-income Indonesians?
4. RQ4 (comparative). In what ways does community-led digital resistance complement or diverge from the state's top-down (blocking and financial-interdiction) approach?

The research gap identifies what is missing from prior scholarship; the novelty of this study lies in how those gaps are addressed. The theoretical novelty is the integration of connective-action theory, the two-step flow of communication/opinion leadership, collective-efficacy theory, inoculation theory, and the theory of planned behavior into a staged explanation that links message production and diffusion to audience outcomes. This extends connective action from settings dominated by Western protest movements into networked public-health communication in a Global South setting and clarifies how social influence may translate into protective behavioral intention.

The methodological novelty is the linkage of computational social network analysis, quantitative content analysis, survey-based PLS-SEM, and qualitative interviews in a convergent mixed-methods design. This integration makes it possible to connect structural position, such as brokerage, with message strategy, source trust, and behavioral outcomes rather than studying network structure and audience response in isolation.

The contextual and practical novelty is the focus on Indonesian community-led digital resistance to online gambling as a demand-side complement to state enforcement. The study therefore offers state agencies, civil society, and platform operators an evidence base for community-anchored interventions that can strengthen digital literacy, youth protection, and social resilience without duplicating site blocking or financial interdiction.

This study is anchored in five complementary theoretical bodies: connective action, the two-step flow of communication/opinion leadership, collective efficacy, inoculation, and the theory of planned behavior. Together they explain (a) how networked, individualised participation can produce collective action without formal organisation; (b) why certain actors disproportionately shape what their audiences believe and do; (c) how communities generate a shared willingness to enforce protective norms; (d) how counter-messaging can build resistance to persuasive harm; and (e) how attitudes, norms, and perceived control are translated into behavioral intention. The section closes by integrating these strands into a single conceptual framework.

Conventional accounts treat gambling as an individual pathology best addressed through regulation and clinical intervention. While indispensable, this framing underweights the social and communicative processes through which online gambling spreads. Digital gambling promotion and user-generated content circulate in social-media environments where young users encounter, interpret, and share messages through peer and influencer networks (Abarbanel et al., 2017; Kaakinen et al., 2020; Thomas et al., 2018). In Indonesia, judol similarly diffuses through influencer endorsements, peer sharing, community chatter, and algorithmically amplified content. PPATK's observation that transactions are becoming smaller and more frequent, and that participation concentrates among low-income and young users (PPATK, 2026), is consistent with a phenomenon embedded in everyday networked life rather than confined to discrete "gambler" populations. If the problem is socially transmitted, then community-led digital resistance to online gambling is a theoretically coherent and largely untested response.

Regulatory enforcement operates on the supply side: it removes access points and raises the transaction costs of participation. The empirical record in Indonesia shows that this can compress monetary throughput, but not the underlying demand, which is sustained by belief, habit, and social normalisation. Demand-side strategies education, norm change, and community mobilization address variables that enforcement cannot reach directly. Experimental network research shows that behavioural diffusion is shaped by network structure and by differences in influence and susceptibility among actors (Aral & Walker, 2012; Centola, 2010). The network-intervention literature likewise shows that behavioural change can be strengthened when it moves through a community's own influential members and existing relationships rather than being introduced only from outside (Valente, 2012; Rogers, 2003). This provides the rationale for treating KOLs, aggregators, and communities not as vectors of harm alone, but as potential agents of protective diffusion.

Bennett and Segerberg (2012, 2013) contrast two logics of coordination: conventional collective action, which rests on formal organisations and a common collective identity, and connective action, which emerges when digitally connected individuals mobilise around flexible, personally meaningful content that each of them can readily adapt and pass on. In connective action, organisation is partly performed by the communication technologies and the actors who curate and route content; participation is individualised yet aggregates into collective outcomes. This framework is well suited to community-led digital resistance to online gambling in Indonesia, which is not driven by a single bureaucratic campaign

but emerges from many KOLs, aggregator pages, and communities producing and remixing personalised warnings, testimonies, and calls to action. Connective action thus supplies the macro-level logic for RQ1 and RQ2: it explains how dispersed, individually authored content can cohere into a recognisable movement of resistance, and it directs analytic attention to the network structures and content frames through which that coherence is achieved.

The two-step flow of communication (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955) holds that mass-media effects usually pass through opinion leaders the people others consult before making up their minds rather than reaching each audience member directly. Contemporary KOLs are the digital descendants of these opinion leaders: their perceived authenticity, relatability, and credibility lend persuasive weight to the messages they carry. This theory specifies the micro-mechanism that connective action presupposes: it is not merely that content circulates, but that content endorsed by trusted intermediaries is more likely to be accepted and acted upon. For this study, opinion leadership motivates the measurement of source credibility and trust (in the survey) and the identification of high-influence brokers (in the network analysis), and it underpins the expectation, tested in RQ3, that KOL-endorsed resistance messaging shifts norms and intentions more strongly than unattributed content.

In Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls's (1997) account, collective efficacy describes how strongly a community holds together socially and how ready its members are to act on one another's behalf when shared standards are at stake. First used to explain why crime is better contained in some neighbourhoods than others, the concept transfers naturally to digital communities confronting online gambling: a community high in collective efficacy is one whose members trust one another and are willing to warn, support, and informally sanction in response to gambling harm. Whereas opinion leadership explains the vertical influence of prominent actors, collective efficacy explains the horizontal, peer-to-peer enforcement of protective norms. It furnishes a community-level construct for RQ3 and clarifies why "grassroots" resistance may succeed where top-down messaging does not: protective norms enforced from within a community carry a legitimacy that external prohibition lacks.

Inoculation theory (McGuire, 1964) proposes that confronting people with a mild, pre-refuted version of a persuasive attack strengthens their ability to withstand stronger versions encountered lateran approach revived in contemporary "prebunking" interventions against online manipulation (Roozenbeek & van der Linden, 2019). Recent randomized and field evidence further shows that brief inoculation interventions delivered on social media can improve recognition of manipulation techniques, confidence in identifying them, and discernment in sharing decisions (Roozenbeek et al., 2022). Applied here, the theory frames anti-online-gambling content not only as corrective, by debunking the illusion of easy winnings, but also as pre-emptive, by forewarning audiences about the persuasive tactics used by gambling promoters. This perspective informs the content-analysis scheme, which distinguishes message frames and prebunking versus debunking strategies, and it generates testable expectations about which message designs most effectively strengthen refusal self-efficacy.

The theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) explains how attitudes, perceived social norms, and perceived behavioural control shape behavioral intention. In this study, refusal self-efficacy operationalises a closely related control mechanism, while descriptive and injunctive norms capture social expectations surrounding abstention. The theory therefore connects exposure and proximal cognitive-social outcomes to the distal intentions to abstain from online gambling, discourage others, share resistance content, and participate in community action.

Integrating these strands, the study models community-led digital resistance to online gambling as a three-stage process. First, opinion leaders and community actors, operating under the logic of connective action, produce and route personalised anti-online-gambling content through a measurable network. Second, actors' structural positions (centrality and brokerage), message design (frame and prebunking / debunking strategy), and source trust shape reach and resonance. Third, audience exposure is associated with proximal outcomes awareness, perceived descriptive and injunctive norms, refusal self-efficacy, and collective efficacy which are expected to predict the distal outcomes of intention to abstain from and discourage online gambling.

The five theoretical components map onto the framework as follows: connective action governs production and diffusion (RQ1–RQ2); opinion leadership and inoculation explain message influence; collective efficacy explains community-level capacity; and the theory of planned behaviour links proximal outcomes to behavioural intention (RQ3).

Production & Diffusion	→	**Mechanism**	→	**Audience Outcomes**
KOLs, aggregators & communities create personalised anti-online-		Network position (centrality, brokerage) + message frame &		Awareness → norms → self-efficacy & collective efficacy →

Production & Diffusion	→	**Mechanism**	→	**Audience Outcomes**
gambling content (connective action)		prebunking/debunking, filtered by source trust		intention to abstain/discourage

Figure 1. Conceptual framework of community-led digital resistance to online gambling.

METHOD

The study adopts a convergent mixed-methods design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018): the quantitative and qualitative strands proceed side by side and are brought together only at the interpretation stage. This design is warranted because the research questions span structural, behavioral, and interpretive levels: network structure and message patterns require computational and content-analytic methods; behavioral outcomes require survey measurement; and the meaning, strategy, and lived experience of resistance require qualitative inquiry. Four strands are combined social network analysis (SNA), quantitative content analysis, a community survey, and key-informant interviews each addressing distinct research questions while informing the others.

The empirical focus is one or more identifiable campaigns of community-led digital resistance to online gambling in Indonesia in which KOLs, content aggregators, and youth, hobby, and government-linked communities are demonstrably involved. Cases will be selected purposively against three criteria: (a) observable grassroots origination, rather than a purely state-run campaign; (b) a sufficient digital footprint across at least two platforms to permit network analysis; and (c) access to campaign actors and audience communities for survey and interview recruitment. Embedding the study in active campaigns enables the collection of primary behavioral and network data that purely external observation cannot provide.

Data are drawn from four sources: (1) platform trace data public posts, shares, mentions, and engagement metrics associated with the focal campaign(s), captured through official platform research APIs and, where APIs are unavailable, through documented manual collection; (2) campaign analytics provided by participating KOLs and community administrators (reach, impressions, engagement, and audience composition); (3) a structured survey administered to members of participating communities; and (4) semi-structured interviews with campaign actors and institutional partners. A defined observation window (for example, the duration of a campaign plus a four-week tail) will bound data capture for comparability.

Strand 1 Social Network Analysis Design (SNA) addresses RQ1 and RQ2 by reconstructing the network through which community-led anti-online-gambling content circulates. The network boundary is specified using a hashtag-and-keyword seed combined with snowball expansion from a set of seed KOLs and community accounts, following a realist boundary-specification logic (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Nodes represent actors; directed, weighted ties represent content-routing interactions (shares, mentions, quotes, replies) and collaboration (co-posting, tagging). Structural metrics are computed and interpreted as set out in Table 1 (centrality measures follow Freeman, 1979), and modularity-based community detection is used to identify sub-clusters corresponding to youth, hobby, and government-linked segments. The detailed SNA protocolnode and tie definitions, attributes, capture procedure, and analysis toolsis integrated below in the Method section.

Table 1. Network metrics and their substantive interpretation

Metric	Definition	Interpretation in this study
Degree centrality	Number of direct ties an actor has.	Overall activity and visibility within the resistance network.
In-degree	Number of incoming ties (being shared/mentioned).	Influence and endorsement; candidate opinion leaders.
Betweenness centrality	How often an actor sits on the shortest route linking two others.	Brokerage; actors bridging otherwise separate communities (weak-tie bridges).
Eigenvector centrality	An actor's influence, weighted by how influential its own connections are.	Embeddedness among other influential actors.
Network density	The share of possible ties that are actually present.	Cohesion and redundancy of the resistance network.

Metric	Definition	Interpretation in this study
Modularity / communities	A division of the network into densely connected clusters.	Identification of youth, hobby, and government-linked sub-movements.
Brokerage / structural holes	Positions spanning gaps between clusters (Burt).	Strategic actors who can seed messages across segments.

Strand 2 quantitative content analysis to characterise the messaging itself (RQ1), a stratified sample of campaign content will be coded using a structured scheme capturing message frame (for example, financial-loss, moral, empathy/testimony, solution/help-seeking), persuasive strategy (prebunking versus debunking), call-to-action type, format, and tone. Two trained coders will double-code an overlapping portion of the sample, and their agreement will be quantified with Krippendorff's alpha; full coding proceeds only once the coefficient reaches at least .80. The coding scheme is integrated below in the Method section.

Strand 3 community survey design survey addresses RQ3 by measuring the association between exposure to community-led digital resistance to online gambling and a set of proximal and distal outcomes. The target population is young Indonesians (aged 17–35) who are members of the participating communities, with deliberate inclusion of lower-income respondents to reflect the population most affected by judol. A purposive quota sampling strategy will be implemented through community partners, with quotas on income and age. A minimum sample of n = 450 is targeted to support structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM) of the hypothesised exposure → mediators → intention model; this exceeds common minima for model complexity and anticipated effect sizes. Constructs are operationalised with established, adapted multi-item scales: media/campaign exposure; source trust and KOL credibility; awareness/knowledge of harms; attitudes (theory of planned behavior; Ajzen, 1991); descriptive and injunctive norms (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990); refusal self-efficacy; collective efficacy (Sampson et al., 1997); and behavioural intention. The complete instrument, with all items and response scales, is integrated below in the Method section.

Strand 4 Key-Informant Interviews. Semi-structured interviews (target n = 12–18) with KOLs, content aggregators, community administrators, and institutional partners (for example, relevant ministries or task forces) address RQ1 and RQ4 by surfacing the strategies, motivations, constraints, and inter-organisational dynamics of resistance, and by eliciting actors' own accounts of how grassroots efforts relate to state enforcement. Interviews will be transcribed and analysed thematically.

Network metrics will be computed in Gephi and/or R (igraph, statnet) and Python (networkx). Survey data will be analysed using descriptive statistics, measurement validation (confirmatory factor analysis; composite reliability, average variance extracted, and discriminant validity), and PLS-SEM (Hair et al., 2022) to estimate the structural model. Content-analysis data will be summarised and cross-tabulated with network position to test whether high-brokerage actors employ distinctive message frames. Qualitative data will be analysed thematically and used to interpret and contextualise the quantitative and structural findings. Integration occurs through a joint display that aligns network, survey, content, and interview findings against each research question.

Quantitative validity is addressed through established scales, measurement-model validation, and intercoder reliability for content analysis. Network reliability is supported by transparent boundary specification and sensitivity checks on tie definitions. Qualitative trustworthiness is pursued through triangulation across strands, an audit trail, and member checking with selected informants. Mixed-methods inference quality is assessed by the coherence of convergent findings across strands.

The study will seek institutional ethics approval prior to data collection. Online gambling is a sensitive and partly stigmatised behavior; the survey therefore measures intentions and general exposure rather than soliciting self-incriminating disclosures, employs informed consent, and guarantees anonymity and secure data handling. Network analysis relies on publicly available content and platform-compliant collection, with care to avoid exposing identifiable individuals to harm. Special protections apply to any respondents under 18, including parental or guardian consent where required. Given documented links between gambling, indebtedness, and distress, recruitment materials will signpost relevant support resources.

All attitudinal items use a five-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree) unless otherwise noted. Frequency items use a five-point scale (1 = Never, 2 = Rarely, 3 = Sometimes, 4 = Often, 5 = Very often). Items marked (R) are reverse-coded. The instrument should be administered in Bahasa Indonesia; a back-translation procedure is recommended to preserve construct equivalence.

Screening and Demographics theoretical basis / adapted from: Standard demographic block; income and age used as quota and stratification variables.

Table 2. Screening and Demographics

Code	Item	Scale
A1	Age in completed years.	Open
A2	Gender.	Categorical
A3	Highest education completed.	Categorical
A4	Average monthly personal income.	<2.5M / 2.5–5M / 5–10M / >10M
A5	Current main activity (student / employed / self-employed / unemployed).	Categorical
A6	Place of residence.	Urban / Peri-urban / Rural
A7	Community memberships (youth, hobby, professional, faith-based, government-linked, other).	Multi-select
A8	Average daily hours on social media.	Open
A9	Platforms used regularly.	Multi-select

Exposure to community-led anti-online-gambling content (independent variable) theoretical basis / adapted from: Bennett & Segerberg (2012); media-exposure measurement.

Table 3. Exposure to Community-Led anti-Online-Gambling Content

Code	Item	Scale
B1	In the past three months, how often have you seen anti–online-gambling content from KOLs/influencers you follow?	1–5 freq
B2	… from community or group accounts you are part of?	1–5 freq
B3	… from content aggregator pages?	1–5 freq
B4	… from government or official accounts?	1–5 freq
B5	How often have you liked, shared, or commented on such content?	1–5 freq
B6	I can recall a specific anti–online-gambling message I saw recently.	1–5

Source trust and KOL credibility (moderator) Theoretical basis / adapted from: Two-step flow / opinion leadership (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955).

Table 4. Source Trust and KOL Credibility (Moderator)

Code	Item	Scale
C1	I trust information about gambling harms when it comes from KOLs I follow.	1–5
C2	The community members who warn about online gambling are credible to me.	1–5

Code	Item	Scale
C3	I find anti-gambling messages from official accounts believable.	1–5
C4	I am more persuaded by people I follow than by anonymous warnings.	1–5

Awareness and knowledge of harms (mediator / proximal outcome)Theoretical basis / adapted from: Inoculation/prebunking (McGuire, 1964; Roozenbeek & van der Linden, 2019).

Table 5. Awareness and Knowledge of Harms (Mediator / Proximal Outcome)

Code	Item	Scale
D1	I understand how online gambling is designed so that players lose over time.	1–5
D2	I am aware that online gambling is linked to debt and online lending.	1–5
D3	I can recognise the persuasive tactics gambling promoters use.	1–5
D4	Online gambling is mostly skill rather than chance. (R)	1–5

Attitudes toward online gambling theoretical basis / adapted from: Theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991).

Table 6. Attitudes Toward Online Gambling

Code	Item	Scale
E1	Playing online gambling is harmful.	1–5
E2	Playing online gambling is foolish.	1–5
E3	Online gambling is an acceptable way to earn money. (R)	1–5
E4	Avoiding online gambling is the wise choice.	1–5

Perceived social norms theoretical basis / adapted from: Focus theory of normative conduct (Cialdini et al., 1990).

Table 6. Perceived Social Norms

Code	Item	Scale
F1	People who are important to me think I should avoid online gambling. (injunctive)	1–5
F2	Most people in my community avoid online gambling. (descriptive)	1–5
F3	In my community, openly criticising online gambling is approved of. (injunctive)	1–5
F4	Many people I know play online gambling. (R, descriptive)	1–5

Refusal self-efficacy (mediator) theoretical basis / adapted from: Perceived behavioural control (Ajzen, 1991).

Table 7. Refusal Self-Efficacy (Mediator)

Code	Item	Scale
G1	I am confident I can refuse invitations to try online gambling.	1–5
G2	I could resist online-gambling ads even when I am short of money.	1–5
G3	I know where to seek help if I or someone close were affected.	1–5

Collective efficacy (community-level mediator) theoretical basis / adapted from: Collective efficacy: cohesion + informal control (Sampson et al., 1997).

Table 8. Collective Efficacy (Community-Level Mediator)

Code	Item	Scale
H1	People in my community are willing to warn each other about online gambling.	1–5
H2	If someone in my community began gambling online, others would step in to help.	1–5
H3	My community can be trusted to look out for one another.	1–5
H4	Members of my community share the goal of keeping each other away from gambling.	1–5

Behavioral intention (distal outcomes) theoretical basis / adapted from: Theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991); connective-action behaviour.

Table 8. Behavioral Intention (Distal Outcomes)

Code	Item	Scale
I1	I intend to avoid online gambling over the next six months.	1–5
I2	I intend to discourage others from online gambling.	1–5
I3	I intend to share anti–online-gambling content.	1–5
I4	I intend to take part in community efforts against online gambling.	1–5

Past participation in resistance (behavioral validation) theoretical basis / adapted from: Connective action (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012).

Table 9. Past participation in resistance (behavioral validation)

Code	Item	Scale
J1	In the past three months I have shared anti–online-gambling content.	Yes/No
J2	I have warned a friend or family member about online gambling.	Yes/No

Code	Item	Scale
J3	I have participated in a community campaign against online gambling.	Yes/No

Detailed Social Network Analysis and Content-Coding Protocol

The network is delimited using a two-pronged strategy: (a) a keyword-and-hashtag seed associated with the focal community-led digital resistance campaign(s) against online gambling, and (b) snowball expansion from a curated set of seed actors (prominent KOLs and community accounts). Inclusion is restricted to actors who post, share, or are mentioned within the defined observation window. A sensitivity analysis will test how alternative boundary thresholds affect core structural findings (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).

Table 10. Node definitions and attributes

Attribute	Description / coding
Actor type	KOL / content aggregator / community account / government-official / news media / individual user.
Segment	Youth / hobby / professional / faith-based / government-linked / other (from profile and content).
Audience size	Follower/subscriber count (continuous; log-transformed for analysis).
Verified status	Platform-verified (yes/no).
Platform	TikTok / Instagram / X / YouTube / Facebook / Telegram.

Ties are directed and weighted by frequency. Two relation types are captured: (1) content-routing tiesshares/reposts, mentions, quotes, and replies that move anti-online-gambling content between actors; and (2) collaboration tiesco-posting, tagging, and joint campaigns. Multiplex ties are recorded separately and may be analysed jointly or by layer.

Where official platform research APIs are available (for example, the TikTok Research API or the X API), data are collected programmatically within the observation window. Where APIs are unavailable, a documented manual-coding procedure with double entry is used. All collection complies with platform terms and applicable data-protection norms; only public content is captured, and identifiable individuals are not singled out for scrutiny.

Structural metrics (degree, in-degree, betweenness, eigenvector centrality), global properties (density, reciprocity, average path length), and modularity-based community detection (for example, the Louvain method) will be computed. Brokerage and structural-hole measures (Burt, 1992) will identify actors who bridge segments. Analysis follows standard social-network-analysis procedures (Borgatti et al., 2018), using Gephi for visualisation and R (igraph, statnet) or Python (networkx) for computation. Interpretation follows Table 1 in the main text.

Table 11. Content-Coding Scheme

Dimension	Categories
Message frame	Financial-loss / moral / empathy-testimony / solution-help-seeking / humour-satire / data-evidence.
Persuasive strategy	Prebunking (forewarning of tactics) / debunking (correcting claims) / appeal only.
Call to action	Avoid / report / seek help / share / none.
Format	Short video / image-text / long-form video / livestream / text post / infographic.
Tone	Fear-based / supportive / informational / confrontational.
Target	General public / youth / parents / players / gamblers' families.

The two coders each code an overlapping 20 percent subsample independently, and reliability is gauged with Krippendorff's alpha (target $\alpha \geq .80$; Krippendorff, 2018). Any disagreements are settled through discussion and refinement of the codebook before full coding begins.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Because this manuscript reports a research proposal, empirical findings are not yet available and no numerical results are claimed. To fulfil the analytical purpose of the Results and Discussion section without fabricating evidence, this section states theoretically grounded expected patterns, competing interpretations, and criteria for evaluating the future findings. The discussion therefore explains what different empirical outcomes would mean for the proposed framework.

Anticipated network and message-diffusion patterns

For RQ1 and RQ2, the principal expectation is that reach will not depend only on raw follower counts or degree centrality. Actors with high betweenness or structural-hole positions may be especially important because they connect otherwise separated youth, hobby, and government-linked clusters. This expectation is consistent with experimental evidence that network structure affects behavioural diffusion and that actors differ in their capacity to influence others (Aral & Walker, 2012; Centola, 2010). If high-brokerage actors do not outperform highly central actors, the finding would suggest that repeated exposure within cohesive clusters, rather than cross-cluster brokerage, is the more important mechanism.

The content analysis is expected to show that empathetic/testimonial, solution-oriented, and prebunking messages generate stronger engagement and more constructive responses than purely moralising or fear-based messages. This expectation is supported by recent inoculation research showing that brief pre-emptive interventions can strengthen recognition of manipulative tactics at scale (Roozenbeek et al., 2022). Engagement metrics, however, will not be treated as equivalent to behavioural change. A message may be widely shared yet have little effect on perceived norms or refusal self-efficacy; the survey strand is designed to test that distinction.

For RQ3, exposure is expected to be positively associated with awareness, anti-gambling norms, refusal self-efficacy, and collective efficacy, with source trust strengthening the exposure–norm relationship and the mediators transmitting part of the association to intention. Research on young people's encounters with gambling content demonstrates that social-media exposure and social context can influence attention, reactions, and gambling-related attitudes (Kaakinen et al., 2020; Thomas et al., 2018). The proposed model therefore tests whether community-led digital resistance to online gambling can reverse that persuasive pathway. Because the survey uses a purposive–quota sample and is primarily associational, the analysis will also consider self-selection, prior anti-gambling attitudes, platform-use intensity, and community membership as alternative explanations; causal claims will be avoided.

For RQ4, the expected contribution is complementarity rather than substitution. Site blocking and financial interdiction target availability and transaction channels, whereas community-led digital resistance to online gambling targets beliefs, norms, trust, and refusal capacity. The strongest policy implication would arise if network reach and behavioural outcomes converge: that is, when the same community actors who bridge clusters also carry messages associated with stronger protective norms and intentions. Divergence would be equally informative. For example, high online reach combined with weak behavioural associations would indicate that visibility alone is insufficient and that message design or source credibility requires greater attention.

The study is expected to demonstrate that the logic of connective action operates not only in protest politics but also in networked public-health resistance, and that its relationship with behavioural intention is conditioned by opinion leadership, inoculation processes, and collective efficacy. It anticipates that brokerage positionsactors bridging youth, hobby, and government-linked clusterswill be disproportionately important to message reach, extending the weak-ties argument (Granovetter, 1973) to harm-reduction diffusion. The theoretical contribution is deliberately testable: if brokerage predicts reach but not audience outcomes, connective action would explain diffusion more strongly than persuasion; if collective efficacy predicts abstention and pro-social discouragement, community-level mechanisms would add explanatory value beyond individual attitudes and exposure.

By integrating social network analysis with PLS-SEM of survey-based outcomes and triangulating the results with content analysis and interviews, the study offers a replicable template for studying digital civic action in Indonesia that links structure to behaviour rather than studying either in isolation. The joint display will also make convergence and divergence visible across strands, so that high structural reach can be compared directly with message characteristics, survey associations, and actor interpretations.

The study is expected to show that community-led digital resistance to online gambling, when channeled through trusted opinion leaders and communities with high collective efficacy, is associated with stronger refusal self-efficacy and intention to abstain than impersonal messaging. It also anticipates that the most effective content combines empathy/testimony framing with prebunking of promotional tactics. These expected patterns are consistent with evidence that digital gambling promotion can normalise gambling and shape young users' responses (Abarbanel et al., 2017;

Kaakinen et al., 2020), while inoculation-based interventions can strengthen resistance to manipulative content (Roozenbeek et al., 2022). If supported empirically, the findings would furnish state agencies, civil society, and platforms with a demand-side complement to supply-side enforcement supporting national objectives in digital literacy, youth protection, and the cultivation of a critical, scientifically literate citizenry.

Hypotheses (for the survey strand)

H1. Exposure to community-led anti-online-gambling content is positively associated with awareness of online-gambling harms.

H2. Exposure is positively associated with anti-gambling injunctive and descriptive norms.

H3. Source trust in KOLs moderates the relationship between exposure and norm perception, such that the association is stronger at higher levels of trust.

H4. Perceived norms, refusal self-efficacy, and collective efficacy mediate the relationship between exposure and intention to abstain.

H5. Collective efficacy is positively associated with intention to discourage others from online gambling (pro-social resistance behavior).

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

This research proposal positions community-led digital resistance to online gambling as a necessary demand-side complement to Indonesia's technical and regulatory response to online gambling. Its central theoretical contribution is a staged explanation of how connective action enables production and diffusion, how opinion leadership and inoculation shape message influence, how collective efficacy supplies community-level capacity, and how the theory of planned behavior links proximal outcomes to behavioral intention. The convergent mixed-methods design connects digital network structure, campaign content, audience responses, and the experiences of campaign actors without claiming empirical findings before data collection. The study recommends that future anti-gambling interventions combine state enforcement with community-anchored communication, prioritise young and low-income groups, use credible local intermediaries, and apply prebunking and supportive testimony rather than relying exclusively on prohibition. Empirical implementation should retain strict ethical safeguards, transparent network-boundary decisions, validated measurement, and triangulation across methods.

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